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For two decades, Washington and New Delhi cultivated one of the most robust strategic partnerships among post–Cold War alliances. Today, that relationship is on a knife-edge after trust between the former Cold War foes evaporated in recent months over tariffs, oil diplomacy, and the great-power competition.

“The trust is gone,” Evan Feigenbaum, a South Asia analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told reporters on Wednesday. “We’re in a situation in the U.S.-India relationship where the premises and assumptions of the last 25 years — that everybody worked very hard to build, including the president in his first term — have just come completely unraveled.”

The relationship hit rock bottom after Trump announced sweeping tariffs on all imports from India this year, accusing New Delhi of buying Russian crude despite the Ukraine war. The duties started at 25 percent and are set to rise to 50 percent on August 27. Instead of persuading India to change its ways, however, the decision seems to have pushed New Delhi closer to Russia — and even to Beijing.

In recent weeks, India’s national security adviser visited Moscow, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar held top-level meetings there, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi wrapped up talks in New Delhi. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is about to take a long-planned trip to China, his first in more than seven years, while Russian President Vladimir Putin will also welcome him in Moscow before the end of the year. Experts say the tilt toward the East is more than performative.

Indian public opinion has also turned against Washington over what it views as an intervention in its sovereign decision-making. “They’re signaling very clearly that they view that as interference in India’s foreign policy, and they are not going to put up with it,” Feigenbaum said.

India also dithered early in the war, but state-run refiners resumed Russian oil imports after discounts of six to seven percent proved too attractive to resist. Russian oil now makes up 35 percent of the country’s crude imports compared to a mere 0.2 percent before the Ukraine conflict. Russia has also sweetened its offer. “We will continue to ship oil, oil products, thermal and coking coal to India, and we see potential for the export of Russian LNG as well,” Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov said.

Factors on Both Sides

The relationship may have hit an inflection point, but South Asia analyst Michael Kugelman, who is based in Washington, D.C., said the decision to impose tariffs was not the sole factor driving New Delhi’s actions. “We’ve seen indications for almost a year of India wanting to ease tensions with China and strengthen relations, mainly for economic reasons. But the Trump administration’s policies have made India want to move even more quickly,” Kugelman said.

While some of New Delhi’s recent moves are more diplomatic theater than substance, some of its actions are much more substantive. Feigenbaum, for one, said he thought “India is going to double down on some aspects of its economic and defense relationship with Russia — and those parts are not performative.”

India was already pivoting away from Russian defense before the Ukraine conflict, buying weapons and systems from the U.S., France, and Israel. But after the invasion, Moscow saw its energy trade with New Delhi explode. Kugelman said that’s because India believed “the U.S. can’t be trusted, whereas Russia can — because Russia is always going to be there for India no matter what.”

Politically at home, Modi has gotten cover as he positions himself as a fierce defender of national sovereignty. He has made the case that he prioritized the livelihoods of farmers, small businesses, and young workers, which resonates deeply in New Delhi. Kugelman said India had already given Washington a lot when it came to making concessions on issues like tariff reduction and worker repatriation. “Because of those concessions, India needs to be careful about signaling further willingness to bend. This is one reason there was no trade deal — Modi put his foot down,” he said.

In Washington, there is a palpable sense of frustration, with Peter Navarro, a former White House trade adviser, writing in the Financial Times that India’s oil purchases are “opportunistic and deeply corrosive. That’s why President Trump put a tariff on Indian goods.”

Feigenbaum called the turning point from “rock-solid” to “really frayed” notable after “a whole series of decisions made not by the Trump administration or even the Biden administration, but by the Indian government itself to signal its independence.”

Washington had long viewed New Delhi as a key democratic bulwark in its Indo-Pacific strategy implemented by the administrations of Obama, Trump, and Biden to counter China’s growing influence and activities in the region. But the problems between the countries that started over trade have now rippled through other domains, including defense and intelligence.

“Countering China has been the glue binding this relationship,” Kugelman said. “But if the U.S.–India relationship continues this free fall, it will be very difficult to sustain.”

The irony, of course, is that the reverse of the current state of affairs played out just a few years ago when the two states concluded their civil nuclear deal in 2008. Washington opened American fuel and technology to New Delhi, despite its refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a rare Cold War-brokered feat when the two allies managed to compartmentalize their differences.

“Back then, India was leveraging its partnership to signal to then-foe China that it had options. Now they’re working with the Chinese to signal Washington rather than the other way around,” Feigenbaum told reporters on Wednesday.